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Abstract— We prove that differential Nash equilibria are
generic amongst local Nash equilibria in continuous zero-
sum games. That is, there exists an open-dense subset of
zero-sum games for which local Nash equilibria are non-
degenerate differential Nash equilibria. The result extends
previous results to the zero-sum setting, where we obtain
even stronger results; in particular, we show that local Nash
equilibria are generically hyperbolic critical points. We further
show that differential Nash equilibria of zero-sum games are
structurally stable. The purpose for presenting these extensions
is the recent renewed interest in zero-sum games within machine
learning and optimization. Adversarial learning and generative
adversarial network approaches are touted to be more robust
than the alternative. Zero-sum games are at the heart of
such approaches. Many works proceed under the assumption
of hyperbolicity of critical points. Our results justify this
assumption by showing ‘almost all’ zero-sum games admit local
Nash equilibria that are hyperbolic.
I. INTRODUCTION
With machine learning algorithms increasingly being
placed in more complex, real world settings, there has
been a renewed interest in continuous games [1]–[3], and
particularly zero-sum continuous games [4]–[7]. Adversarial
learning [8], [9], robust reinforcement learning [10], [11],
and generative adversarial networks [6] all make use of zero-
sum games played on highly non-convex functions to achieve
remarkable results.
Though progress is being made, a theoretical understand-
ing of the equilibria of such games is lacking. In particular,
many of the approaches to learning equilibria in these ma-
chine learning applications are gradient-based. For instance,
consider an adversarial learning setting where the goal is
to learn a model or network by optimizing a function f ∈
Cr(Θ ×W,R) over θ ∈ Θ where w ∈ W is chosen by an
adversary. A general approach to this problem is to study
the coupled learning dynamics that arise when one player is
descending f and the other is ascending it—e.g.,[
θ+
w+
]
=
[
θ − γDθf(θ, w)
w + ηDwf(θ, w)
]
.
Most convergence analysis depends on an assumption of
local convexity in the game space around an equilibrium—
that is, nearby Nash equilibria the Jacobian of the gradient-
based learning rule is assumed to be locally positive definite.
Indeed, with respect to the above example, in consideration
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of the limiting dynamics x˙ = −ω(x) where x = (θ, w)
and ω(x) = (Dθf(x),−Dwf(x)), many of the convergence
guarantees in this setting proceed under the assumption that
around critical points, the Jacobian
J(θ, w) =
[
D2θf(θ, w) Dθwf(θ, w)
−Dwθf(θ, w) −D2wf(θ, w)
]
is positive definite—i.e., there is some notion of local con-
vexity in the game space. Given the structural assumptions
often invoked in the analysis of these learning approaches,
two questions naturally arise:
• Is this a ‘robust’ assumption in the sense of structural
stability—i.e., does the property persist under smooth
perturbations to the game?;
• Is this assumption satisfied for ‘almost all zero-sum
games’ in the sense of genericity?
Building on the work in [12]–[14], this paper addresses these
two questions.
Towards this end, we leverage a refinement of the local
Nash equilibrium concept that defines an equilibrium in
terms of the first- and second-order optimality conditions for
each player holding all other players fixed. This refinement
has implicitly in its definition this notion of local convexity
in the game space; it also has a structure that is particularly
amenable to computation and which can be exploited in
learning since it is characterized in terms of local informa-
tion. Efforts to show this refinement is both structurally stable
and generic aid in justifying its broad use.
A. Contributions
The contributions are summarized as follows:
a. We prove that differential Nash equilibria—a refine-
ment of local Nash equilibria defined in terms of first- and
second-order conditions which characterize local optimality
for players—are generic amongst local Nash equilibria in
continuous zero-sum games (Theorem 2). This implies that
almost all zero-sum games played on continuous functions
admit local Nash equilibria that are strict and isolated.
b. Exploiting the underlying structure of zero-sum game—
i.e., the game is defined in terms of a single sufficiently
smooth cost function—we show that all differential Nash
equilibria are hyperbolic (Proposition 3), meaning they are
locally exponentially attracting for gradient-play. Combining
this fact with the above, we also show that local Nash
equilibria are generically hyperbolic (Corollary 1).
c. We prove that zero-sum games are structurally stable
(Theorem 3); that is, the structure of the game—and hence,
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its equilibria—is robust to smooth perturbations within the
space of zero-sum games.
In [12]–[14], similar results to a. and c. were shown for the
larger class of general-sum continuous games. Yet, the set of
zero-sum games is of zero measure in the space of general-
sum continuous games, and hence, the results of this paper
are not a direct implication of those results. Further, b. is a
much stronger statement than the genericity result in [13].
In particular, [13] shows that non-degenerate differential
Nash equilibria are generic amongst local Nash equilibria.
We, on the other hand, show that in the class of zero-sum
games, all differential Nash equilibria are non-degenerate,
and moreover, hyperbolic. The latter is a particularly strong
result, achievable due to the specific structure of the zero-sum
game. Indeed, two-player zero-sum continuous games are
defined completely in terms of a single sufficiently smooth
function—i.e., given f ∈ Cr(X,R), the corresponding zero-
sum game is (f,−f).
Moreover, the work in this paper focuses on a class of
games of particular import to the machine learning and robust
control communities, where many recent works have made
the assumption of hyperbolicity of local Nash equilibria
without a thorough understanding of whether or not such an
assumption is restrictive (see e.g. [7], [15]–[18]). The results
in this paper show that this assumption simply rules out a
measure zero set of zero-sum games.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Before developing the main results, we present our general
setup, as well as some preliminary game theoretic and math-
ematical definitions. Additional mathematical preliminaries
are included in Appendix A.
A. Preliminary Definitions
In this paper, we consider full information continuous,
two-player zero-sum games. We use the term ‘player’ and
‘agent’ interchangeably. Each player i ∈ I = {1, 2} selects
an action xi from a topological space Xi in order to
minimize its cost fi : X → R where X = X1 ×X2 is the
joint strategy space of all the agents. Note that fi depends
on x−i which is the collection of actions of all other agents
excluding agent i—that is, fi : (xi, x−i) 7→ fi(xi, x−i) ∈
R. Furthermore, each Xi can be finite-dimensional smooth
manifolds or infinite-dimensional Banach manifolds. Each
player’s cost function fi is assumed to be sufficiently smooth.
A two-player zero-sum game is characterized by a cost
function f ∈ Cr(X,R) in the sense that the first player
aims to minimize f with respect to x1 and the second player
aims to maximize f with respect to x2—that is, f1 ≡ f and
f2 ≡ −f . Hence, given a function f , we denote a two-player
zero-sum game by (f,−f) where f ∈ Cr(X,R).
As is common in the study of games, we adopt the Nash
equilibrium concept to characterize the interaction between
agents.
Definition 1. A strategy x = (x1, x2) ∈ X is a local Nash
equilibrium for the game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) if for each i ∈ I
there exists an open set Wi ⊂ Xi such that xi ∈Wi and
fi(xi, x−i) ≤ fi(x′i, x−i), ∀ xi′ ∈Wi\{xi}.
If the above inequalities are strict, then we say (x1, x2) is
a strict local Nash equilibrium. If Wi = Xi for each i, then
(x1, x2) is a global Nash equilibrium.
In [12] and subsequent works [13], [14], a refinement of
the local Nash equilibrium concept known as a differential
Nash equilibrium was introduced. This refinement character-
izes local Nash in terms of first- and second-order conditions
on player cost functions, and even in the more general non-
convex setting, a differential Nash equilibrium was shown to
be well-defined and independent of the choice of coordinates
on X . Moreover, for general sum games, differential Nash
were shown to be generic and structurally stable in n-player
games.
Towards defining the differential Nash concept, we intro-
duce the following mathematical object. A differential game
form is a differential 1-form ω : X → T ∗X defined by
ω = ψX1 ◦ df − ψX2 ◦ df
where ψXi are the natural bundle maps ψX1 : T
∗X → T ∗X
that annihilate those components of the co-vector field df
corresponding to X1 and analogously for ψX2 . Note that
when each Xi is a finite dimensional manifold of dimensions
mi (e.g., Euclidean space Rmi ), then the differential game
form has the coordinate representation,
ωψ =
∑m1
j=1
∂(f◦ψ−1)
∂yj1
dyj1 +
∑m2
j=1
∂(−f◦ψ−1)
∂yj2
dyj2,
for product chart (U,ψ) in X at x = (x1, . . . , xn) with local
coordinates (y11 , . . . , y
m1
1 , y
1
2 , . . . , y
m2
2 ) and where U = U1×
U2 and ψ = ψ1 × ψ2. The differential game form captures
a differential view of the strategic interaction between the
players. Note that each player’s cost function depends on its
own choice variable as well as all the other players choice
variables. However, each player can only affect their payoff
by adjusting their own strategy.
Critical points for the game can be characterized by the
differential game form.
Definition 2. A point x ∈ X is said to be a critical point
for the game if ω(x) = 0.
In the single agent case (i.e., optimization of a single cost
function), critical points can be further classified as local
minima, local maxima, or saddles by looking at second-order
conditions. Analogous concepts exist for continuous games.
Proposition 1 (Proposition 2 [12]). If x ∈ X is a local
Nash equilibrium for (f1, f2) = (f,−f), then ω(x) = 0 and
D2i fi(x) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I.
These are necessary conditions for a local Nash equilib-
rium. There are also sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria.
Such sufficient conditions define differential Nash equilib-
ria [13], [14].
Definition 3. A strategy x ∈ X is a differential Nash
equilibrium for (f1, f2) = (f,−f) if ω(x) = 0 and D2i fi(x)
is positive–definite for each i ∈ I.
Differential Nash need not be isolated. However, if dω(x)
is non-degenerate for x a differential Nash, where dω =
d(ψX1 ◦ df) − d(ψX2 ◦ df), then x is an isolated strict
local Nash equilibrium. Intrinsically, dω ∈ T 02 (X) is a
tensor field; at a point x where ω(x) = 0, it determines
a bilinear form constructed from the uniquely determined
continuous, symmetric, bilinear forms {d2fi(x)}ni=1. We use
the notation Dω to denote the bilinear map induced by dω
which is composed of the partial derivatives of components
of ω. For example, consider a two-player, zero-sum game
(f1, f2) = (f,−f). Then, via a slight abuse of notation, the
matrix representation of this bilinear map is given by
Dω(x) =
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−DT12f(x) −D22f(x)
]
.
The following definitions are pertinent to our study of
genericity and structural stability of differential Nash equilib-
ria; there are analogous concepts in dynamical systems [19].
Definition 4. A critical point x is non-degenerate if
det(Dω(x)) 6= 0 (i.e. x is isolated).
Non-degenerate differential Nash are strictly isolated local
Nash equilibria [14, Theorem 2].
Definition 5. A critical point x is hyperbolic if Dω(x) has
no eigenvalues with zero real part.
All hyperbolic critical points are non-degenerate, but not
all non-degenerate critical points are hyperbolic. Hyperbolic
critical points are of particular importance from the point
of view of convergence, were they have local guarantees of
exponential stability or instability [20]. We note that even
in the more general manifold setting, these definitions are
invariant with respect to the coordinate chart [14], [19].
B. Mathematical Preliminaries
In order to prove genericity of non-degenerate differential
Nash, we now introduce the necessary mathematical prelim-
inaries.
Consider smooth manifolds X and Y of dimension nx and
ny respectively. An k–jet from X to Y is an equivalence
class [x, f, U ]k of triples (x, f, U) where U ⊂ X is an open
set, x ∈ U , and f : U → Y is a Ck map. The equivalence
relation satisfies [x, f, U ]k = [y, g, V ]k if x = y and in some
pair of charts adapted to f at x, f and g have the same
derivatives up to order k. We use the notation [x, f, U ]k =
jkf(x) to denote the k–jet of f at x. The set of all k–
jets from X to Y is denoted by Jk(X,Y ). The jet bundle
Jk(X,Y ) is a smooth manifold (see [21] Chapter 2 for the
construction). For each Ck map f : X → Y we define a
map jkf : X → Jk(X,Y ) by x 7→ jkf(x) and refer to it
as the k–jet extension.
Definition 6. Let X , Y be smooth manifolds and f : X → Y
be a smooth mapping. Let Z be a smooth submanifold of Y
and p a point in X . Then f intersects Z transversally at p
(denoted f t Z at p) if either f(p) /∈ Z or f(p) ∈ Z and
Tf(p)Y = Tf(p)Z + (f∗)p(TpX).
For 1 ≤ k < s ≤ ∞ consider the jet map jk :
Cs(X,Y ) → Cs−k(X, Jk(X,Y )) and let Z ⊂ Jk(X,Y )
be a submanifold. Define⋂| s(X,Y ; jk, Z) = {h ∈ Cs(X,Y )| jkh t Z}. (1)
A subset of a topological space X is residual if it contains
the intersection of countably many open–dense sets. We say
a property is generic if the set of all points of X which
possess this property is residual [19].
Theorem 1. (Jet Transversality Theorem, Chap. 2 [21]). Let
X , Y be C∞ manifolds without boundary, and let Z ⊂
Jk(X,Y ) be a C∞ submanifold. Suppose that 1 ≤ k <
s ≤ ∞. Then, ⋂| s(X,Y ; jk, Z) is residual and thus dense
in Cs(X,Y ) endowed with the strong topology, and open if
Z is closed.
Proposition 2. (Chap. II.4, Proposition 4.2 [22]). Let X,Y
be smooth manifolds and Z ⊂ Y a submanifold. Suppose
that dimX < codimZ. Let f : X → Y be smooth and
suppose that f t Z. Then, f(X) ∩ Z = ∅.
The Jet Transversality Theorem and Proposition 2 can be
used to show a subset of a jet bundle having a particular set of
desired properties is generic. Indeed, consider the jet bundle
Jk(X,Y ) and recall that it is a manifold that contains jets
jkf : X → Jk(X,Y ) as its elements where f ∈ Ck(X,Y ).
Let Z ⊂ Jk(X,Y ) be the submanifold of the jet bundle
that does not possess the desired properties. If dimX <
codim Z, then for a generic function f ∈ Ck(X,Y ) the
image of the k–jet extension is disjoint from Z implying that
there is an open–dense set of functions having the desired
properties. It is exactly this approach we use to show the
genericity of non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria of
zero-sum continuous games.
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we specialize the results in [12] and [14]
on genericity and structural stability of differential Nash
equilibria to the class of zero-sum games.
A. Genericity
To develop the proof that local Nash equilibria of zero-
sum games are generically non-degenerate differential Nash
equilibria, we leverage the fact that it is a generic property
of sufficiently smooth functions that all critical points are
non-degenerate.
Lemma 1 ( [19, Chapter 1]). For Cr functions, r ≥ 2 on
Rn, or on a manifold, it is a generic property that all the
critical points are non-degenerate.
The above lemma implies that for a generic function f ∈
Cr(X,R) on an m–dimensional manifold X , the Hessian
H(x) =
 D
2
1f(x) · · · D1mf(x)
...
. . .
...
Dm1f(x) · · · D2mf(x)

is non-degenerate at critical points—that is, det(H(x)) 6= 0.
Lemma 2. Consider f ∈ Cr(X,R) and the zero-sum game
(f,−f). For any critical point x ∈ X (i.e., x ∈ {x ∈
X| ω(x) = 0}), det(H(x)) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ det(Dω(x)) 6= 0.
Proof: Before proceeding we note that in the case that X
is a smooth manifold, the stationarity of critical points and
definiteness of H and Dω are coordinate-invariant properties
and hence, independent of coordinate chart [12]–[14], [19].
Thus, to shorten the presentation of proofs, we simply treat
the Euclidean case here; showing the more general case
simply requires selecting a coordinate chart defined on a
neighborhood of the differential Nash, showing the results
with respect to this chart, and then invoking coordinate
invariance.
Let x = (x1, x2) where X = X1 × X2 and Xi is mi–
dimensional. Note that H(x) is equal to Dω(x) with the last
m2 rows scaled each by −1. Indeed,
Dω(x) =
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−DT12f(x) −D22f(x)
]
where D2i f(x) is mi × mi dimensional for each i ∈
{1, 2} and D12f(x) is m1 × m2 dimensional. Clearly,
Dω(x) = PH(x) where P = blockdiag(Im1 ,−Im2) with
each Imi the mi ×mi identity matrix, so that det(H(x)) =
(−1)m2 det(Dω(x)). Hence, the result holds.
This equivalence between the non-degeneracy of the Hes-
sian and the game Jacobian Dω allows us to lift the fact
that non-degeneracy of critical points is a generic property
to zero-sum games.
Proposition 3. Consider a two-player, zero-sum continuous
game (f,−f) defined for f ∈ Cr(X,R) with r ≥ 2. A differ-
ential Nash equilibrium is non-degenerate, and furthermore,
it is hyperbolic.
Proof: It is enough to show that all differential Nash
are hyperbolic since all hyperbolic equilibria correspond to
a non-degenerate Dω. Further, just as we noted in the proof
of Lemma 2, stationarity, definiteness, and non-degeneracy
are coordinate-invariant properties. Thus, we simply treat the
Euclidean case here.
By definition, at a differential Nash equilibrium x of a
zero-sum game, ω(x) = 0, D21f(x) > 0, and −D22f(x) > 0.
Further, in zero-sum games, D212f = (D
2
21f)
T . Thus, the
bilinear map Dω, takes the form
Dω(x) =
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−D21f(x) −D22f(x)
]
=
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−DT12f(x) −D22f(x)
]
.
Let (λ, v) be an eigenpair of Dω(x). The real part of λ,
denoted Re(λ), can be written as
Re(λ) = 12 (λ+ λ¯) =
1
2 (v
∗DωT (x)v + v∗Dω(x)v)
= 12v
∗(DωT (x) +Dω(x))v
=
1
2
v∗
[
D21f(x) 0
0 −D22f(x)
]
v > 0
where the last line follows from the positive definiteness
of diag(D21f(x),−D22f(x)) at a differential Nash equilib-
rium. Hence, x is hyperbolic and, clearly, at this point
det(Dω(x)) 6= 0.
The above proposition provides a strong result for the
class of zero-sum games. In particular, simply due to the
structure of Dω, all differential Nash have the nice property
of being hyperbolic, and hence, exponentially attracting
under gradient-play dynamics—that is, x˙ = −ω(x) or its
discrete time variant x+ = x − γω(x) for appropriately
chosen stepsize γ. Note that numerous learning algorithms
in machine learning applications of zero-sum games take this
form (see, e.g., [3], [4], [6]).
Theorem 2. For two-player, zero-sum continuous games,
non-degenerate differential Nash are generic amongst local
Nash equilibria. That is, given a generic f ∈ Cr(X,R),
all local Nash equilibria of the game (f,−f) are (non-
degenerate) differential Nash equilibria.
Proof: First, critical points of a function f are those such
that (D1f1(x) D2f2(x)) = 0 and hence they coincide with
critical points of the zero-sum game—i.e., those points x
such that ω(x) = (D1f(x),−D2f(x)) = 0. By Lemma 2,
for any critical point x, det(H(x)) = 0 if and only if
det(Dω(x)) = 0. Hence, critical points of f are non-
degenerate if and only if critical points of the zero-sum game
are non-degenerate.
Consider a generic function f and the corresponding zero-
sum game (f,−f). If X is a smooth manifold, let (U,ϕ) be
a product chart on X1×X2 that contains x. Suppose that x
is a local Nash equilibrium so that ω(x) = 0 and D21f(x) ≥
0 and −D22f(x) ≥ 0. By the above argument, since f is
generic and the critical points of f coincide with those of
the zero-sum game, det(Dω(x)) 6= 0. By Lemma 1, critical
points of a generic zero-sum game are non-degenerate. That
is, there exists an open-dense set of functions f in Cr(X,R)
such that critical points of the corresponding game are non-
degenerate.
Let J2(X,R) denote the second-order jet bundle contain-
ing 2–jets j2f such that f : X → R. Then, J2(X,R) is
locally diffeomorphic to
Rm × R× Rm × Rm(m+1)2
and the 2–jet extension of f at any point x ∈ X in
coordinates is given by
(ϕ(x), (f ◦ ϕ−1)(ϕ(x)), Dϕf(x), (Dϕ)2f(x))
where Dϕf = [Dϕ1 f D
ϕ
2 f ] with D
ϕ
j = [∂(f ◦
ϕ−1)/(∂y1j ) · · · ∂(f ◦ ϕ−1)/(∂ymij )] and similarly for
(Dϕ)2f . Again, we note that the properties of interest
(stationarity, definiteness, and non-degeneracy) are known to
be coordinate invariant.
Consider a subset of J2(X,R) defined by
D = Rm × R× {0m} × Z(m1)× Rm1×m2 × Z(m2)
where Z(mi) is the subset of symmetric mi ×mi matrices
such that for A ∈ Z(mi), det(A) = 0. Each Z(mi) is
algebraic and has no interior points; hence, we can use the
Whitney stratification theorem [23, Chapter 1, Theorem 2.7]
to get that each Z(mi) is the union of submanifolds of co-
dimension at least 1. Hence D is the union of submani-
folds and has co-dimension at least m + 2. Applying the
Jet Transversality Theorem (Theorem 1) and Proposition 2
yields an open-dense set of functions f such that when
ω(x) = 0, det(D2i f(x)) 6= 0, for i = 1, 2.
Now, the intersection of two open-dense sets is open-dense
so that we have an open-dense set of functions f in Cr(X,R)
such that when ω(x) = 0, det(D2i f(x)) 6= 0 for each i ∈
{1, 2} and det(Dω(x)) 6= 0. This, in turn, implies that there
is an open-dense set F of functions f in Cr(X,R) such
that for zero-sum games constructed from these functions,
local Nash equilibria are non-degenerate differential Nash
equilibria. Indeed, consider an f ∈ F in this set such that
x is a local Nash equilibrium of (f,−f). Then necessary
conditions for Nash imply that ω(x) = 0, D21f(x) ≥ 0 and
−D22f(x) ≥ 0. However, since f ∈ F , det(D21f(x)) 6= 0
and det(−D22f(x)) = (−1)m2 det(D22f(x)) 6= 0. Hence, x
is a differential Nash equilibrium. Moreover, since f ∈ F ,
det(H(x)) 6= 0 which is equivalent to det(Dω(x)) 6= 0 (by
Lemma 2). Thus, x is a non-degenerate differential Nash.
As shown in Proposition 3, all differential Nash for zero-
sum games are non-degenerate simply by the structure of
Dω. This further implies that local Nash equilibria are
generically hyperbolic critical points, meaning there are no
eigenvalues of Dω with zero real part.
Corollary 1. Within the class of two-player zero-sum contin-
uous games, local Nash equilibria are generically hyperbolic
critical points.
Proof: Consider a two-player, zero-sum game (f,−f) for
some generic sufficiently smooth f ∈ Cr(X,R). Then, by
Theorem 2, a local Nash equilibria x is a differential Nash
equilibria. Moreover, by Proposition 3, x is hyperbolic so
that all eigenvalues of Dω(x) must have strictly positive real
parts. This implies that all such points are hyperbolic critical
points of the gradient dynamics x˙ = −ω(x).
B. Structural Stability
Genericity gives a formal mathematical sense of ’almost
all’ for a certain property—in this case, non-degeneracy
and further hyperbolic. In addition, we show that (non-
degenerate) differential Nash are structurally stable, meaning
that they persist under smooth perturbations within the class
of zero-sum games.
Theorem 3. For zero-sum games, differential Nash equi-
libria are structurally stable: given f ∈ Cr(X1 × X2,R),
g ∈ Cr(X1 × X2,R), and a differential Nash equilibrium
(x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2, there exists a neighborhoods U ⊂ R of
zero and V ⊂ X1 ×X2 such that for all t ∈ U there exists
a unique differential Nash equilibrium (x˜1, x˜2) ∈ V for the
zero-sum game (f + tg,−f − tg).
Proof: Define the smoothly perturbed cost function f˜ :
X1 ×X2 × R → R by f˜(x, y, t) = f(x, y) + tg(x, y), and
its differential game form ω˜ : X1×X2×R→ T ∗(X1×X2)
by
ω˜(x, y, t) = (D1(f˜(x, y)+tg(x, y),−D2(f˜(x, y)+tg(x, y)),
for all t ∈ R and (x, y) ∈ X1 ×X2.
Since (x1, x2) is a differential Nash equilibrium,
Dω˜(x, y, 0) is necessarily non-degenerate (see the proof of
Corollary 1). Invoking the implicit function theorem [24],
there exists neighborhoods V ⊂ R of zero and W ⊂ X1×X2
and a smooth function σ ∈ Cr(V,W ) such that for all t ∈ V
and (x1, x2) ∈W ,
ω˜(x1, x2, s) = 0 ⇐⇒ (x1, x2) = σ(t).
Since ω˜ is continuously differentiable, there exists a neigh-
borhood U ⊂ W of zero such that Dω˜(σ(t), t) is invertible
for all t ∈ U . Thus, for all t ∈ U , σ(t) must be the unique
Nash equilibrium of (f + tg|W ,−f − tg|W ).
We note that both the genericity and structural stability
results follow largely from the fact that the class of two-
player zero-sum games are defined completely in terms of a
single (sufficiently) smooth function f ∈ Cr(X,R), so that
its fairly straightforward to lift the properties of genericity
and structural stability to the class of zero-sum games from
the class of smooth functions. We also remark that the
perturbations considered here are those such that the game
remains in the class of zero-sum games; that is, the function
f is smoothly perturbed and this induces the perturbed zero
sum game (f + tg,−f − tg).
IV. EXAMPLES
To illustrate the implications of structural stability, we
provide a simple example. Consider a classic set of zero-
sum continuous games known as biliear games. Such games
have similar characteristics as bimatrix games played on the
simplex; in particular, bimatrix games have the same cost
structure as bilinear games where the stratgegy space of the
former is considered to be a probability distribution over the
finite set of pure strategies. This is particularly interesting
since it demonstrates that interior equilibria of such games
can be altered arbitrarily small perturbations.
Example 1. Consider two-players with decision variables
x ∈ Rdx and y ∈ Rdy respectively, playing a zero-sum game
on the function:
f(x, y) = xTAy
Where A ∈ Rdx×dy . The x player would like to minimize
f while the y player would like to maximize it. Looking at
ω for this game, we can see that the local Nash equilibria
live in N (A) × N (AT ), where N (A) and N (AT ) denote
the nullspaces of A and AT respectively:
ω(x, y) =
[
Ay
−ATx
]
We note that the local Nash equilibria are not differential
Nash equilibria, and that Dω has purely imaginary eigen-
values everywhere since it is skew-symmetric. Thus the local
Nash equilibria are non-hyperbolic and this a non-generic
case. Letting f = f(x, y) − 2 ||x||2, we see that ω for this
perturbed game (denoted ω) has the form:
ω(x, y) =
[
Ay − x
−ATx
]
This perturbation fundamentally changes the critical points,
and looking at Dω, we can see that for any  > 0, there
are no more local Nash equilibria:
Dω(0, 0) =
[−Idx A
−AT 0
]
Since any arbitrarily small perturbation of this form can
cause all of the local Nash equilibria to change, these games
cannot be structurally stable.
We now show how this behavior extends to more compli-
cated settings. Specifically we present an example of a game
of rock-paper-scissors where both players have stochastic
policies over the three actions which are parametrized by
weights. The following example highlights how this classic
problem is non-generic and the behavior changes drastically
when the loss is perturbed in a small way.
Example 2. Consider the game of rock-paper-scissors where
each player has three actions {0, 1, 2}, with payoff matrix:
M =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0

Each player i ∈ {1, 2} has a policy or mixed strategy pii
parametrized by a set of weights {wij}j∈{0,1,2} of the form:
pii(j) =
exp(−βiwij)∑2
k=0 exp(−βiwij)
Where βi is a hyper-parameter for player i that determines
the ’greediness’ of their policy with respect to their set of
weights. For simplicity, we treat pii as a vector in R3. Each
player would like to maximize their expected reward given
by
f(w1, w2) = pi
T
1 Mpi2.
We note that there is a continuum of local Nash equilibria
for the policies pii = [13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ] for i ∈ {1, 2} and that this
is achieved whenever each player has all of their weights
equal.
In Fig. 1 we show the trajectories of the policy of player
1, when β1 = β2 = 1 and both players use gradient descent
to update their weights at each iteration. In Figure 1A. we
see that player 1 cycles around the local Nash equilibrium
Fig. 1: The trajectory of the policy of player 1 under gradient-
play for A. rock-paper scissors and B. a perturbed version of
rock-paper-scissors. A. Player 1 cycles around the local Nash
equilibrium of ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) from either initialization (shown
with circles). We remark that player 1’s time average policy
is in fact ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). B. Player 1 diverges from the local Nash
equilibrium from either initialization for the perturbed game
given by (2).
in policy space. In Figure 1B. we show the trajectories of
the policy of player 1, starting from the same initializations,
but for a perturbed version of the game defined by
f(w1, w2) = pi
T
1 Mpi2 + g(w1, w2) (2)
where  = 1e-3 and g(x, y) = ||y||2 − ||x||2. Here we can
see that this relatively small perturbation causes a drastic
change in the behavior where player 1 diverges from the
Nash of the original game and converges to the sub-optimal
policy of always playing action zero.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The focus of this paper is on the genericity and struc-
tural stability of a particular refinement of the local Nash
equilibrium concept—namely, differential Nash equilibria—
within the class of two-player, zero-sum continuous games.
The renewed interest in zero-sum games on continuous
action spaces is primarily due to the widespread adoption of
game theoretic tools in areas such as robust reinforcement
learning and adversarial learning including generative ad-
versarial networks. For instance, zero-sum continuous game
abstractions have shown to be particularly adept at learning
robust policies for a wide-variety of tasks from classification
to prediction to control.
Most learning approaches are based on local information
such as gradient updates, and as such, representations of
Nash equilibria that are amenable to computation such as
the differential Nash concept are extremely relevant. Much
of the existing convergence analysis for machine learning
algorithms based on game-theoretic concepts proceeds un-
der the structural assumptions implicit in the definition of
the differential Nash equilibrium concept. In this paper,
we show that characterizations such as these are generic
and structurally stable; hence, the aforementioned structural
assumptions only rule out a measure zero set of games, and
the desired properties are robust to smooth perturbations in
player costs.
APPENDIX
A. Additional Mathematical Preliminaries
In this appendix, we provide some additional mathemat-
ical preliminaries; the interested reader should see standard
references for a more detailed introduction [24], [25].
A smooth manifold is a topological manifold with a
smooth atlas. In particular, we use the term manifold
generally; we specify whether it is a finite– or infinite–
dimensional manifold only when necessary. If a covering
by charts takes their values in a Banach space E, then E
is called the model space and we say that X is a Cr–
Banach manifold. For a vector space E, we define the vector
space of continuous (r + s)–multilinear maps T rs (E) =
Lr+s(E∗, . . . , E∗, E, . . . , E;R) with s copies of E and r
copes of E∗ and where E∗ denotes the dual. Elements of
T rs (E) are tensors on E, and T
r
s (X) denotes the vector
bundle of such tensors [25, Definition 5.2.9].
Suppose f : X → M is a mapping of one manifold X
into another M . Then, we can interpret the derivative of f on
each chart at x as a linear mapping df(x) : TxX → Tf(x)M.
When M = R, the collection of such maps defines a 1–form
df : X → T ∗X . Indeed, a 1–form is a continuous map
ω : X → T ∗X satisfying pi ◦ω = IdX where pi : T ∗X → X
is the natural projection mapping ω(x) ∈ T ∗xX to x ∈ X .
At a critical point x ∈ X (i.e., where df(x) = 0), there
is a uniquely determined continuous, symmetric bilinear
form d2f(x) ∈ T 02 (X) such that d2f(x) is defined for all
v, w ∈ TxX by d2(f ◦ ϕ−1)(ϕ(x))(vϕ, wϕ) where ϕ is any
product chart at x and vϕ, wϕ are the local representations
of v, w respectively [26, Proposition in §7]. We say d2f(x)
is positive semi–definite if there exists α ≥ 0 such that for
any chart ϕ,
d2(f ◦ ϕ−1)(ϕ(x))(v, v) ≥ α‖v‖2, ∀ v ∈ Tϕ(x)E. (3)
If α > 0, then we say d2f(x) is positive–definite. Both
critical points and positive definiteness are invariant with
respect to the choice of coordinate chart.
Consider smooth manifolds X1, X2. The product space
X1 × X2 is naturally a smooth manifold [25, Defini-
tion 3.2.4]. There is a canonical isomorphism at each point
such that the cotangent bundle of the product manifold splits:
T ∗(x1,x2)(X1 ×X2) ∼= T ∗x1X1 ⊕ T ∗x2X2 (4)
where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of vector spaces. There are
natural bundle maps ψX1 : T
∗(X1 × X2) → T ∗(X1 ×
X2) annihilating the all the components other than those
corresponding to Xi of an element in the cotangent bundle.
In particular, ψX1(ω1, ω2) = (01, ω2) and ψX2(ω1, ω2) =
(ω1, 02) where ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ T ∗x (X1 × X2) and 0j ∈
T ∗xjXj for each j ∈ {1, 2} is the zero functional.
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